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NUMBERED LIVES SOME STATISTICAL OBSERVATIONS FROM 77
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
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NUMBERED LIVES: SOME STATISTICAL OBSERVATIONS
FROM 77 INTERNATIONAL HOSTAGE EPISODES

Brian Jenkins, Janera Johnson, and David Ronfeldt

July 1977

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PREFACE

Approximately one-fifth of all incidents of international terrorism involve taking hostages -- by taking over embassies or other public buildings or kidnapping individuals. Terrorists seize hostages -- diplomats, corporate executives, tourists, sometimes just anybody handy -- to deliberately heighten the drama of the episode guaranteeing widespread publicity and increasing their leverage by placing human life in the balance.

A major portion of The Rand Corporation's continuing research on international terrorism has focused on the problem of hostage situations. The following paper, which examines 77 international hostage incidents, was initially included in a report prepared for the Department of State and Department of Defense. However, numerous requests for the information it contains persuaded us to issue it as a separate paper. The paper also appears in the first issue of a new journal, *Conflict: An International Journal*.

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NUMBERED LIVES: SOME STATISTICAL OBSERVATIONS
FROM 77 INTERNATIONAL HOSTAGE EPISODES

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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

In the following pages we examine 77 international hostage incidents and make a number of observations that are pertinent to the formulation of policy and procedures for handling such episodes. The main findings may be summarized as follows:

- o Rough estimates as to the payoffs and risks involved in kidnapping indicate that the terrorist tactic of seizing hostages for bargaining or publicity purposes is far from being irrational, mindless, ineffective, or necessarily perilous. There is almost an 80 percent chance that *all* members of the kidnapping team will escape death or capture, whether or not they successfully seize hostages. Once they make explicit ransom demands, there is a close to even chance that all or some of those demands will be granted and virtually a 100 percent probability of achieving worldwide or at least national publicity.
- o Standard kidnapping tactics are more likely in countries where the terrorists are operating on home terrain and have an underground organization. Barricade and hostage incidents are more likely when the terrorists are operating abroad, or at home in countries where they lack the local capability for sustaining underground operations.
- o American diplomats and other American representatives abroad have been the most popular targets of kidnappers, figuring in more than a third of all international hostage incidents during the past six years. However, kidnappers have *explicitly* targeted the U.S. government with their demands in only three incidents.

- o In two-thirds of the cases in which explicit demands were made, they were directed at the local government. The release of prisoners was the principal demand in two-thirds of the cases in which demands were made.
- o Firm no-concession policies toward individual kidnappings have not clearly served as deterrents to future kidnapping tactics. The demise of such tactics appears to result mainly from effective anti-terrorist campaigns that destroy the organization and apprehend its members regardless of specific ransom policies. A no-concessions policy may affect the form more than the frequency of kidnapping--that is, the kidnappers may make propaganda rather than concessions their main objective.
- o Except in possibly one case, no local government changed its no-ransom policy during an episode because of presumed U.S. influence.
- o The decision by governments to meet or reject the demands of kidnappers does not appear to have been much affected by the rank or by the number of hostages held.
- o More hostages have died during an assault by security forces than from cold execution by the terrorists.

These observations derive from an examination of 77 international hostage incidents that took place between August 1968 and June 1975. These incidents consist of reported kidnappings, attempted kidnappings, barricade and hostage incidents, and attempts to seize hostages by various urban guerrilla or terrorist organizations, or in some cases by lone gunmen. Together they constitute the total number of hostage incidents in which foreign government officials were kidnapped or kidnappers' demands were made on governments. In 52 of the incidents, the hostages were diplomats, honorary consuls, or other government representatives serving abroad. In the remaining cases, the hostages include members of a *National Geographic* film crew, members of an Olympic team, Jewish emigrés, passengers at airports, the crew of a ferry, doctors, students, missionaries, and in several cases the residents of border settlements in Israel. These were included because the demands were directed at

governments. With one exception, the kidnappings of local government officials by indigenous terrorists have not been included because they are not international. (The exception concerns a Canadian government official whose kidnapping is closely related to the kidnapping of a British official.) The total also excludes airline hijackings and the numerous kidnappings (primarily in Latin America) of business executives.

It is hazardous to draw statistical inferences from so small a universe. The conclusions that may be suggested, or the predictions that seem inherent, are quite tentative. In our analysis of the cases we have given the actual numbers and the percentages these represent; we have done this to give greater meaning to the imprecise words that are commonly used in place of numbers: "a lot," "most of the time," "frequently," "a vast majority of." The data do not permit a high level of confidence based upon rigorous quantitative analysis of a sufficiently large population of events. The actual percentages may mean very little; categorizing a single episode one way or another may change the percentage number by as much as four or five. And, of course, not all episodes fall neatly into one category or another, compelling us to make some qualitative judgments.

Finally, it must be emphasized that the findings are historical. We are not making predictions. Each episode is unique; its management and outcome depend on many factors impossible to include in this effort. In handling any episode, decisions still must be based primarily on the judgment of those on the scene or directly involved, rather than on statistical inferences from the past.

With these caveats, the exercise provides a useful, concrete means for highlighting recent trends as well as examining some current assumptions that may depend on imperfect recollections of a limited number of past episodes. Although we cannot really discuss hypothetical kidnappers or a hypothetical kidnapping, we do make assumptions about such matters as the actions of kidnappers, the outcome of individual episodes, or the effect of government responses on the potential actions of future kidnappers. For example, it is not likely that any gunmen who are contemplating a diplomatic kidnapping will have kept track of all past international hostage incidents or will base their actions on a rigorous

analysis of costs and benefits. Yet we assume that they will make some rough calculations comparing the risks involved with the payoffs they expect to receive, and that these calculations will be based upon some knowledge of previous episodes. That assumption is inherent in many government policies. If it were not, there would be no basis at all for not conceding to kidnappers' demands on the grounds of deterrence; for deterrence, in this case, presumes memory. Likewise, the actions of a government during an episode draw upon expectations that in turn are based on past experience. Whether they are explicit or implicit, "scientific" or intuitive, calculations are being made as well as assumed on all sides.

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

Trends in Hostage Events

One hostage incident occurred in 1968, three in 1969, 23 in 1970, six in 1971, three in 1972, 13 in 1973, 15 in 1974, and 13 in the first half of 1975. This corresponds roughly to the overall pattern of international terrorism as shown in Fig. A.1.*

Identity of the Kidnappers

The hostages in the chronology were seized by members of 29 known guerrilla or terrorist groups, of whom 17 are credited with only one international incident. Those groups that appear in the chronology more than once are shown in Table A.1.

Seven other hostage episodes were effected by Palestinian splinter groups, some of them claiming association with the PLO. Eleven other attempts to seize hostages were carried out by hitherto unheard of (non-Palestinian) groups, organizationally unaffiliated individuals, or unknown persons. Four were carried out by lone gunmen. (The fact that two groups participated jointly in some of the kidnappings accounts for the disparity in the total.)

* The curve for trends in international terrorism is calculated from Brian Jenkins and Janera Johnson, *International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-1974*, The Rand Corporation, R-1597-DOS/ARPA, March 1975.




Fig.A.1 — Trends in hostage events

Table A.1

GROUPS THAT APPEAR IN THE CHRONOLOGY MORE THAN ONCE

Group	Number of Incidents	Group	Number of Incidents
Tupamaros (Uruguay)	5	FAR (Guatemala)	3
PFLP (Palestinian)	4	ERP (Argentina)	2
VPR (Brazil)	4	ETA (Spain)	2
ELF (Ethiopia)	4	FLQ (Canada)	2
TPLA (Turkey)	3	URA (Japan)	2
ESO (Palestinian)	3	Raader-Meinhof (Germany)	2
ALN (Brazil)	3		

If we classify hostage episodes according to the regional origins and interests of the perpetrators, then 30 were related to Latin American political struggles. Another 33 (including the ELF) were related to conflicts in the Middle East. Fourteen pertained to various group or individual causes in Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America.

Nationality of the Hostages

Officials and citizens of the United States have been the hostages or the targets of kidnapping attempts in 29 (38 percent) of the episodes. Israeli officials have been the second most popular targets, primarily, of course, of Arab terrorists. West Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the Netherlands follow in that order. Thirteen of the episodes involved hostages of more than one nationality, including two cases in which the sole victims were honorary consuls who held dual citizenships. In four cases, the nationalities of the hostages were unknown, and probably were not important.* The breakdown is given in Table A.2. (The numbers refer to the number of episodes, not the actual number of hostages.)

Geographic Sites of the Hostage Incidents

The 77 episodes occurred in 36 countries, and West Berlin. Latin American countries account for the most (31); 20 occurred in Middle Eastern countries, 12 in Europe, 7 in Africa, 4 in Asia, and 3 in North America. The breakdown is given in Table A.3.

Identity of the Target Governments

Israel leads the list of target countries. Of 60 cases in which kidnappers made specific demands, Israel was the target five times. And on the basis of leaflets found on the bodies of terrorists killed in the act of taking hostages, or other evidence, Israel was the intended victim on four more occasions and was one of the four governments upon whom demands were made in the Khartoum episode, for a total of 10 times as the target of demands.

* See incidents 42, 43, 65, and 70, below.

Table A.2
NATIONALITY AND EPISODE BREAKDOWN

Nationality of the Hostages	Episodes Involving Hostages of One Nationality	Episodes Involving Hostages of More than One Nationality	Total
United States	25	4	29
Israel	9		9
West Germany	6	2	8
United Kingdom	4	2	6
France	3	2	5
Canada	1	2	3
Netherlands	1	2	3
Japan	2		2
Soviet Union	2		2
Switzerland	2		2
Venezuela		2	2
Belgium		2	2
Saudi Arabia		2	2
Mexico	1	1	2
Brazil	1		1
Greece	1		1
India	1		1
Paraguay	1		1
Philippines	1		1
Singapore	1		1
Chile			1
Czechoslovakia		1	1
Jordan		1	1
Nicaragua		1	1
Jewish emigrés		1	1
Unknown		4	4

Israel was followed by Brazil, Uruguay and West Germany, whose governments were the targets of ransom demands in four cases each; the Dominican Republic, France, Guatemala, and Jordan three each; Argentina, Turkey, Mexico, Canada, and the United States two each; and the other countries mentioned below, one each. In the remaining 20 cases the kidnappers failed to take hostages, made no demands, the target of the demands was not specified, or the episode was simply unclear. In the Khartoum episode the initial demands were made on Israel, Jordan, the United States, and West Germany, although the most serious

Table A.3
GEOGRAPHIC SITES

7 each	5 each	4 each	3 each	2 each	1 each
Israel	Argentina	Ethiopia	Dominican	Burma	Austria
	Brazil	Turkey	Republic	Canada	Bolivia
	Uruguay		Guatemala	Colombia	Cuba
			Jordan	France	Haiti
			Lebanon	Greece	Iran
			Mexico	Spain	Kuwait
					The Netherlands
					Nicaragua
					Pakistan
					Singapore
					Somabo
					Sudan
					Sweden
					Tanzania
					Thailand
					United Kingdom
					United States
					Venezuela
					West Berlin
					West Germany

demands seemed to be those made on Jordan. (The multiple listing of this incident accounts for the disparity in the total.) The breakdown is given in Table A.4.

It is interesting to note the disparity between the government or nationality of the hostages and the targets of the ransom demands. Although U.S. officials have been the most popular targets of kidnappers, in only three cases has the United States explicitly been the target of the kidnappers' demands, and in one case--Khartoum--the most serious demands appear to have been those levied on the government of Jordan. Saudi Arabian diplomats have been held hostage in two cases, but never has Saudi Arabia been the target of any specific demands. The disparity suggests that kidnappers often chose their hostages for the value they possessed as representatives of governments that were considered important or believed to be influential, and not because their government was necessarily the enemy or the principal target of the kidnappers.

Table A.4

TARGET GOVERNMENTS

Country	Number	Country	Number
Israel	10	Bolivia	1
Brazil	4	Burma	1
Uruguay	4	Colombia	1
West Germany	4	Cuba	1
Dominican Republic	3	Greece	1
Guatemala	3	Haiti	1
France	3	India	1
Jordan	3	Japan	1
Turkey	3	Nicaragua	1
United States	3	Philippines	1
Argentina	2	Singapore	1
Canada	2	Spain	1
Mexico	2	Tanzania	1
Austria	1	Venezuela	1

Kidnappings or Barricade and Hostage

There are two basic types of hostage situations. In traditional kidnappings the hostage is taken to a secret underground hideout and kept during the ransom negotiation. The kidnappers communicate by note or telephone, at their own initiative, and they may break off communications at will. They can be talked to only during phone calls; otherwise they might be reached indirectly by broadcasts or press publications.

The second type is commonly called a barricade and hostage situation. The kidnappers seize one or more hostages but make no attempt to reach a hideout, or are prevented from doing so. They are, or allow themselves to be, surrounded in a public place. In effect, they are also hostages. They usually barricade themselves in a building or a plane, and immediately warn that any attempt to kill or capture them will imperil their hostages. The terrorists then include their own escape as part of any subsequent bargain.

Standard kidnappings account for the majority of politically motivated hostage situations. Of the 77 episodes, 49 are standard kidnappings, attempted kidnappings, or kidnappings that accidentally turned into a barricade and hostage situation when the kidnappers' hideout was located and surrounded. Twenty-four of the 77 episodes

were barricade and hostage situations, attempted seizures of hostages in which terrorists were captured or killed before they could make their demands known, or abductions that were deliberately turned into barricade and hostage situations by the kidnappers. The remaining four episodes were unplanned barricade and hostage situations in which the seizure of hostages was not the primary objective of the terrorists. These occurred when terrorists on other missions simply grabbed any handy hostages to bargain for their escape. The overall breakdown is given in Table A.5.

Table A.5

KIDNAPPING AND BARRICADE EVENTS

Kidnappings	42
Attempted kidnappings	6
Kidnappings accidentally turned into barricade and hostage situations when hideout discovered	<u>1</u>
Total kidnapping events	49
Barricade and hostage situations	16
Attempted barricade and hostage situations	5
Kidnappings deliberately turned into barricade and hostage situations	3
Unplanned barricade and hostage situations solely to effect escape	<u>4</u>
Total barricade events	28
Total hostage events	77

Comparative Advantages and Disadvantages

Each type of episode has advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage of standard kidnapping is that it requires only a brief initial period of exposure to danger at any time during the episode. If the kidnapping attempt fails, the kidnappers may kill the intended hostage and have a very good chance of escaping. If the abduction succeeds, the kidnappers usually have the ability to hold their hostage safely

underground for a period of time. If the kidnappers' demands are not met, they may kill or release the hostage and easily escape. If their demands are not cash or something else that they have to pick up, they do not have to expose themselves again, as is the case, for example, if they demand the release of prisoners. It is difficult, however, to obtain more than one hostage in a standard kidnapping. The preferred hostage--a high-ranking diplomat or government official--may be protected by bodyguards, thus often requiring more men and greater risks for terrorists to begin a kidnapping rather than barricade operation.

These observations are reflected in the following statistics: Of the 43 successful kidnappings in the chronology, 35 of them, or 81 percent, involved only one hostage. The others involved two to four hostages and one involved eight hostages, but they were collected in three separate episodes. Significantly, all of the episodes involving more than one hostage were the work of guerrillas operating at isolated sites or in remote areas of the country (Ethiopia, Turkey, Burma, Tanzania). No multiple hostage seizures occurred in urban centers.

A major contrasting advantage of barricade tactics is the opportunity to capture a large number of hostages. The average number of hostages involved in the 43 kidnappings was 1.4, but the median was one. In the 12 planned barricade and hostage situations, the average size of the hostage group was 14, and the median was six.* If we leave off the incident in Ma'alot in which Arab terrorists held approximately 90 teenagers hostage in a school (incident 57), the average is eight. If we leave off Ma'alot but add the four unplanned hostage episodes, the average number of hostages is 11. In a standard kidnapping, even if terrorists were able to kidnap and escape with eight to ten hostages, holding them in a hideout would present difficult problems of concealment and logistics.

Although the size of the hostage group varies in the types of events, there are no major differences in the rank of importance of the hostages

* In incident 62, the kidnapper held the Philippine ambassador hostage while another embassy official, who was superficially wounded, lay on the floor pretending to be dead. We have counted it as one hostage.

held. Of the 43 successful kidnappings, the kidnappers managed to get an ambassador, or at least a consul general, in 11 cases (26 percent). In the 16 planned barricade and hostage situations, there were ambassadors (in one case two ambassadors) among the hostages held in five cases (31 percent).

It apparently requires fewer men to carry out a successful operation (success being the seizure of hostages) in a barricade and hostage situation than in a standard kidnapping. Although there are two cases (incidents 46 and 62) in which lone gunmen have seized a hostage in an embassy, three seem to be about the minimum required to make an attack, guard the hostages, keep a lookout for a possible assault, negotiate, sleep, etc. The average number of men involved in the 16 barricade and hostage situations was five or six. Moreover, in such situations the kidnappers require no significant local capability to remain "underground," as is the case in traditional kidnappings.

We have only estimates for the number of individuals involved in standard kidnappings. In incident 53, a lone gunman may have kidnapped a diplomat, and in several cases more than 20 men were at the scene of the abduction. But generally the number of individuals involved in the actual seizure of hostages seems to run between six and ten. The Tupamaros of Uruguay, who developed kidnapping to a fine art, are reported to have mobilized as many as 40 or 50 members to carry out an operation. In addition to the individuals in the vehicle designated to clock the car of the intended hostage and those whose function it was to seize the hostage, the Tupamaros deployed cars with additional gunmen, cars as ambulances with medics, cars to change to on the way to the hideout, and so on. Guarding a hostage in a hideout also requires men, not always the same as those who do the actual kidnapping. And maintenance of the hideout may require additional logistical support, especially if the captivity and negotiations last a long time. In sum, standard kidnappings appear to require more people and much greater organizational infrastructure to support the operation than a barricade and hostage situation.

A further possible advantage of a standard kidnapping is that kidnappers have the opportunity to consult with their own higher

headquarters during the episode. It is more difficult to do so when surrounded by security forces in a barricade situation.

Duration of Two Types of Episodes

A standard kidnapping often lasts a long time because the perpetrators have well-concealed hideouts as well as an efficient underground and good logistics system that can function for weeks. If they are in a remote area, it may be fairly easy to move to avoid detection and capture, and thus they can hold out for their original demands over a long period of time. Moreover, communications and negotiations are slowed in kidnappings because the protagonists do not have face-to-face contact as is often the case in barricade events.

The average length of the standard kidnappings from capture to release or death of the hostage is 38 days. The median is four to five days. (This excludes incident 53, the Patterson case, and incident 65, the kidnapping of the Dutch honorary consul in Colombia, whose case is still in progress. Patterson was kidnapped and later killed. His body was found several months later.) Five episodes account for 75 percent of the total captivity days. Two of these were in the countryside of Burma and Ethiopia (see incidents 40 and 54). Three were kidnappings by the Tupamaros, who had an elaborate system of "people's prisons," underground hideouts in the city of Montevideo. If these are excluded, as well as those incidents in which the hostages were killed, the average length of the episode is 12 days, and the median is four days. The breakdown is given in Table A.6.

Barricade and hostage situations can be measured in hours rather than days. The average duration of the 15 barricade and hostage situations and kidnappings deliberately turned into barricade and hostage situations is approximately 47 hours. If we exclude the 13-day barricade and hostage situation in the Dominican Republic (incident 60), the average length is 33 hours.

Distribution of Hostage Incidents by Region and Type of Incident

Latin American terrorists clearly preferred kidnapping over barricade and hostage tactics, using it in 25 (83 percent) of the regional

Table A.6
DURATION OF EPISODES

Incident Number	Duration of Episode in Days	Result	Incident Number	Duration of Episode in Days	Result
2	3	Released	28	244	Released
3	1	Released	29	1	Released
4	17	Released	30	4	Released
5	2	Released	31	6	Killed
6	3	Released	32	7	Released
7	17	Released	40	329	Released
8	4	Released	41	2	Released
9	4	Released	47	4	Released
11	5	Killed	49	2	Released
13	5	Released	53	?	Killed
14	1	Released	54	169	Released
15	5	Released	55	1	Released
16	2	Released	66	170+	Still in Progress
17	10	Killed			
18	205	Released	67	2	Killed
20	207	Released	68	5	Released
21	8	Released	69	3	Released
23	59	Released	72	2	Released
24	8	Killed	74	1	Released
26	23	Released	75	67	Released
27	41	Released	77	12	Released

hostage events. Kidnapping was facilitated by the fact that the terrorists were operating on home ground and in many cases had significant underground organizations. The few (5) barricade and hostage situations took place twice in the Dominican Republic and once each in Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua--all small countries in which there were no significant insurgent organizations. Moreover, two of these cases did not entail political causes.

The pattern for Middle East terrorism is quite distinct. Barricade and hostage events have predominated by a small margin, occurring in 18 (56 percent) of the 33 cases. The 15 kidnappings include four incidents in Ethiopia, four in Turkey, three in Jordan, three in Lebanon, and one failure to take a hostage in Iran. The Ethiopian and Turkish kidnappings took place on the home ground of insurgents that had significant organizations. In Ethiopia, the ELF also controlled large

rural areas. Rather than targeting specific victims, they were essentially detaining foreigners crossing terrain they claimed to govern. The three Jordanian and three Lebanese cases, committed by Palestinian groups, also occurred essentially on home ground. In contrast, all 18 barricade events were committed by Palestinian or Palestinian-allied terrorists who were seizing hostages in foreign countries (including Israel) where they had no underground organization and needed maximum publicity to gain recognition. See Table A.7.

Table A.7

INCIDENTS BY TYPE AND REGION

	Kidnappings and Attempted Kidnappings	Barricade and Hostage Events
Latin America	25	5
Middle East	15	18
Other	<u>9</u>	<u>5</u>
Total	49	28

Trends by Type of Event

Figure A.2 shows the distribution over time of standard kidnappings and attempted kidnappings as opposed to planned and unplanned barricade and hostage situations, or attempts to create barricade and hostage situations. For the universe we are examining, the figure shows a preliminary decline in standard kidnapping versus an increase in barricade and hostage situations. Most (70 percent) of the kidnappings in the chronology took place before the occurrence of the first barricade and hostage situation at the Munich Olympiad in September 1972. The year 1970 saw 47 percent (23) of the kidnappings, and afterward their incidence declined rapidly, though it began to rise again in the first six months of 1975. The trend line for barricade events has steadily risen in the past few years (though no predictions should be inferred from this point).




Fig. A.2 — Trends by type of events

The high points and low points in these trend lines relate closely to the regional activities of the major terrorist movements. Where they had effective underground infrastructures and were operating on home ground, traditional kidnapping was the predominant mode of operation. Thus Latin American struggles--mainly in Brazil, Guatemala, and Uruguay during the 1969-71 period--account for much of the big kidnapping run before the appearance of the barricade trend. Meanwhile two Middle Eastern countries also contributed a number of kidnappings: Ethiopia, where the separatist ELF controlled sizable territories; and Turkey, which had two significant underground organizations. By 1972, security forces had destroyed the revolutionary organizations in most of the Latin American countries and Turkey. The reduced rate of kidnappings in Latin America since then is mainly owed to sustained

underground operations in Argentina and the appearance of new revolutionary groups in Mexico. See Table A.8.

Table A.8

INCIDENTS BY TYPE, REGIONAL INTEREST, TIME

	Kidnappings and Attempted Kidnappings		Barricade and Hostage Events	
	Before Mid 1972	After Mid 1972	Before Mid 1972	After Mid 1972
Latin America	19	6	0	5
Middle East	11	4	0	18
Other	4	5	0	5
Total	34	15	0	28

Where terrorists are operating abroad or lack the capabilities for underground operations, barricading with hostages has proved to be the preferred tactic. The majority of the barricade events, 15 out of 28, were carried out by Arab or Moslem terrorists operating on behalf of Palestinian causes in Europe, Asia, or Israel. Moreover, the episodes during 1974 and 1975 apparently represented a shift in Palestinian tactics, away from taking hostages in distant countries to mounting three-man or slightly larger commando raids in attempts to seize hostages in Israel itself. (Knowing that the Israeli government is unlikely to accede to any demands even though they successfully capture hostages, these attacks appear sacrificial, nearly suicidal, a tendency seldom evident in previous Palestinian operations.) Meanwhile, beginning well after the first such event staged by the Palestinians, there were almost as many barricade as kidnapping episodes in Latin America during the post-1972 period. These were all enacted in small countries by local groups or individuals that lacked significant underground capabilities.

The trend figures need to be seen in context. What they do not show are additional kidnapping and barricade incidents that are not included in the chronology we are examining. Although kidnapping

episodes appear predominant before 1972, mainly because of Latin American terrorist operations, Palestinian groups staged a number of spectacular airline hijackings in 1969 and 1970 to obtain hostages. A "skyjacking" may be considered a special kind of barricade and hostage situation. The trend lines also do not show the continued kidnappings of foreign business executives or of local officials of foreign corporations that were carried out by urban guerrillas in Argentina during the last few years, following their first success in 1971 at kidnapping an honorary consul who was also an important businessman (see incident 32). In 1973 alone there were 20 such kidnappings in Argentina. If international political skyjackings were added to the barricade and hostage trends, and if the abductions related to foreign business operations were added to the kidnapping trends, then the overall trend lines would appear far less dramatic.

The View from the Kidnappers' Side

Taking hostages generally involves greater exposure to risks than planting a bomb or gunning someone down. Yet the record indicates that dire consequences befall only a few perpetrators of international hostage incidents. Most simply escape by fleeing underground, securing safe passage abroad, or by "surrender" to a friendly government. The record also indicates that, given the successful seizure of hostages, terrorists can often expect some concrete payoff against their specified demands. If a bargaining situation is established (that is, if the terrorists are not on a sacrificial or suicidal mission), some payoff is more likely than total rejection.

The Target of the Demands

In the majority of cases, terrorists holding hostages directed their demands at the local or host government. Of the 77 episodes listed in the chronology, explicit demands were articulated in 57 cases, and in another three cases the intent of the demands was learned following the death or capture of the terrorists during gun battles with security agents. Thus, we have some record of demands against governments or nongovernmental bodies in 60 cases.

In 39 (65 percent) of these episodes, the demands were directed only at the local government. In eight cases, including five Palestinian raids on Israeli territory, the local government also corresponded to the hostages' own government. In 12 other incidents (20 percent), the terrorists seized hostages who were not local citizens and then directed their demands at the hostage's home government. The full breakdown is given in Table A.9.

Table A.9

TARGETS OF THE DEMANDS

Principal demands on local government	32
Principal demands on local government that was also hostages' government	8
Principal demands on hostage's government where it was not local government	12
Multiple demands on hostage's government and other governments (see incident 30) but not local government	1
Demands on other than local or hostage government (see incident 44)	1
Demands for cash ransom from private organization, family, or unspecified	4
Target of demands unclear	3
Total	60

In eight of the 77 cases listed in the chronology, guerrillas or terrorists failed to capture their intended hostages or were killed before making their demands known. In nine, no ransom demands were made.

Nature of the Demands

In the majority of the cases where demands were made or known later, the demands included prisoners in 40 (or 67 percent) of the 60 cases. In 26 cases (43 percent), the kidnappers required *only* the release of prisoners. In four of these cases, the kidnappers initially demanded the release of prisoners but later added or substituted monetary demands

(incidents 18, 37, 41, and 49). In 12 cases, the kidnappers' demands included both money and the release of prisoners, and in one of these the kidnappers also asked for weapons. Of the remaining nine cases, the principal demands in five included safe passage out of the country, in one safe passage for surrounded comrades, in one an exit visa for a relative and in one the distribution of food and materials. In addition, the kidnappers once held a hostage to dissuade a government from imposing death sentences on several comrades being tried; in another case it was learned that the kidnappers had intended to demand an audience with the leader of the hostage's country; and finally, the kidnappers once demanded that the local government halt the emigration of Soviet Jews through its borders. The breakdown is given in Table A.10.

Table A.10

NATURE OF THE DEMANDS

Demand only the release of prisoners	26
Known intent to gain release of prisoners	2
Release of prisoners and monetary demands	12
Monetary demands only	6
Other	12
Unclear	<u>2</u>
Total	60

Payoff Outcomes

Kidnappers successfully gained some specified payoff in at least 27 (45 percent) of the 60 cases in which explicit demands were made or planned for the release of prisoners, monetary rewards, or some other change in status. In 20 (33 percent) of the cases, the terrorists achieved full compliance with their demands. In six of these, the perpetrators required nothing more than safe passage out of the country for themselves or surrounded comrades, or in one case, an exit visa for a relative. Whereas these latter six cases were all barricade events, standard kidnappings accounted for most of the successes involving larger demands for prisoners and money. In another seven

episodes the terrorists achieved partial payoff successes, agreeing to accept something less than their original demands. In all but one of the 27 cases of full or partial success, the kidnappers escaped by going underground or gaining safe passage. In the one case, the kidnapper surrendered after his demands were met.

In four cases there was no payoff, but the perpetrators were *offered and accepted* safe passage out of the country *in lieu of* their original demands. Three of these were barricade events of fairly long duration, and the fourth was a kidnapping in which security forces were closing on the hideout.

The outcome for 26 (43 percent) of the 60 cases was total rejection of the kidnappers' original demands (except possibly for the publication of a propaganda manifesto in one or two cases). Most of these cases occurred in countries where the local governments had adopted hard line, anti-concessionary policies, including Israel (6), Jordan (3), Turkey (3), and Uruguay (3). Five barricade events and one kidnapping discovered by security forces terminated with the death of all the perpetrators, as well as many hostages. Four other barricade situations ended with death for some and prison for other terrorists. In four barricade episodes the terrorists "surrendered" to Arab governments. Fifteen kidnappings ended with the escape of all the terrorists and in two other cases of most of the perpetrators. In one kidnapping (incident 53), the family of the hostage was willing to pay the ransom demanded, but the kidnappers broke contact. The body of the hostage was found later; one case (incident 66) is still in progress. The breakdown is given in Table A.11.

In almost all cases the terrorists at least attracted substantial public attention to their cause and identity, a major goal that was explicit or implicit in their actions. Indeed it is generally difficult to tell whether many terrorists were more interested in concessions to specific demands or in public recognition and front-page publicity. To the extent that the latter was a leading objective, and it appears to have been so in many events that ended in total rejection of demands from a bargaining perspective, then such episodes also represent partial successes.

Table A.11
OUTCOMES OF DEMANDS^a

	Kidnappings	Barricade and Hostage
Full demands met	10	4
Demands for safe passage met	--	6
Less than full demands agreed upon	4	3
Safe passage in lieu of original demands	1	3
Rejections	15	11
Unclear	3	--

^aThe total is 47 because incident 53 is not counted.

Fate of the Terrorists

All or some of the perpetrators managed to escape in 62 (81 percent) of the 77 incidents. In at least 55 (71 percent), all those involved went free. In three kidnapping cases, some of the kidnappers eluded capture while some of their cohorts were caught and imprisoned. In four barricade situations the Palestinian teams surrendered to Arab governments and were apparently set free soon thereafter. In only two cases were terrorists known to be wounded--once escaping from an attempted kidnapping and another after the detonation of explosives that belonged to the terrorists.* One case is still in progress.

Kidnappers were captured and imprisoned in only nine (12 percent) of the episodes. In two barricade situations they deliberately surrendered, in one case given compliance to payoff demands regarding a relative's exit visa from a foreign country. In six other cases they did not willingly give up: A few were seized while their comrades escaped, others died during gun battles with the police. In two of these six cases, the imprisonments were only temporary: A subsequent airplane hijacking led to the release by the West German government of the Palestinian perpetrators of the Munich massacre (incident 35); and a subsequent

*This is based upon information available to us. Others may have been wounded that we are not aware of.

barricade event (incident 52) resulted in liberation of the Palestinians responsible for the Athens airport massacre (incident 43). Nevertheless, police are known to have eventually apprehended or killed the terrorists involved in at least eight underground kidnappings, mainly because the individuals continued to participate in new terrorist operations in Latin American countries and Turkey.

Death was not a typical fate for the perpetrators, occurring in only 12 (16 percent) of the episodes. Only one kidnapping incident ended in death when the Turkish police discovered the hideout and a gun battle ensued. The other 11 were barricade and hostage situations, eight of which involved Palestinian terrorists. Seven of the eight Palestinian episodes, ending in death for all but one individual, amounted to commando operations on Israeli soil in which the terrorists exposed themselves on near-suicidal missions. If these seven episodes are discounted, only five (7 percent) of the remaining 70 incidents ended in death for the terrorists.

Kidnapping appears to be a less risky operation than barricading with hostages. All perpetrators escaped in 90 percent of the 49 traditional kidnapping incidents. The perpetrator escaped or surrendered to an Arab government in 83 percent of the 21 barricade situations that did not involve commando raids on Israeli territory. However, kidnappers were more likely to be apprehended during later incidents in their home country, as government security forces worked to destroy the terrorist organization. See Table A.12. In any case, both kidnapping and barricade tactics evidently have not involved high risks for the perpetrators.

If we use just the subsample of 60 cases in which demands were posited or planned, all but a few terrorists managed to escape in 46 episodes. They all escaped unharmed in 41 cases, "surrendered" to Arab governments in four cases, and most escaped and a few comrades ended up in prison in one additional episode. In four other cases, the terrorists surrendered and were jailed, except for one man who escaped and another who died. In two cases some perpetrators were imprisoned while others died after a gun battle with security forces. Seven episodes, including five Palestinian raids on Israeli territory, ended in death for all kidnappers, save one who was captured.

Table A.12

FATE OF PERPETRATORS AND MODES OF ESCAPE
BY NUMBER OF EPISODES

	Fate of Perpetrators		
	Death	Imprisonment	Escape
Kidnappings	1	3	47
Barricades	<u>11</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>15</u>
Total	12	9	62

	Modes of Escape		
	"Surrender"	"Bangkok"	Underground
Kidnappings	0	1	46
Barricade	<u>4</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	4	13	46

Some Payoff-Risk Calculations

Terrorists probably do not engage in formal cost-benefit analysis while preparing an operation. Yet solely on the basis of the history of the 77 cases in the chronology, a potential kidnapper could conclude that, on a global scale, he had the following probabilities of success and risk:

- o 90 percent probability of actually seizing hostages;
- o 77 percent chance that *all* members of the kidnapping team would escape punishment or death, whether or not they successfully seized hostages;
- o 40 percent chance that all or some demands would be met in operations where something more than just safe passage or exit permission was demanded;
- o 36 percent chance of full compliance with such demands;
- o 86 percent chance of success where safe passage or exit, for themselves or other, was the sole demand;
- o 60 percent chance that, if concessions to the principal demands were rejected, all or nearly all of the kidnappers could

still escape alive by going underground, accepting safe passage in lieu of their original demands, or surrendering to a sympathetic government; and

- o almost a 100 percent probability of gaining major publicity whenever that is one of the terrorist goals.

In sum, the record suggests that the tactic of seizing hostages for bargaining or publicity is far from being irrational, mindless, ineffective, or necessarily perilous.

Fate of the Hostages

Hostages were successfully taken in 66 of the 77 episodes (including the three unplanned barricade and hostage episodes). In all, 348 hostages were taken: 53 hostages were killed; one was seriously wounded and freed; at least seven were slightly injured during one assault; 20 were wounded or injured during another assault (see incident 56); one suffered a heart attack after a lengthy captivity and was released; 15 were subjected to a lengthy captivity; one is still in captivity; the rest, 250 or 72 percent, were released unharmed. Seventy hostages were seized at Ma'alot. If we exclude these five incidents, which account for 40 percent of the hostages, then in 62 episodes, 208 hostages were taken of whom 33 were killed and 175, or 84 percent, were released alive. Only one man escaped from captivity.*

Table A.13 indicates the historical record by episode. It is interesting to note that in only nine of the 66 episodes, or 14 percent, were hostages deliberately killed by their captors without the provocation of an assault or shootout initiated by security forces.

Table A.14 shows the fate of the hostage in what began as kidnappings compared with the fate of those in what began as barricade and hostage situations. At least some of the hostages were killed in eight (19 percent) out of 43 standard kidnapping cases. In barricade and hostage situations, hostages were murdered in four (17 percent) of the 23 episodes. The difference, given the small size of the sample, is

* See incident 60.

Table A.13

FATE OF THE HOSTAGES

	Number of Episodes
Hostages released	45
Hostages released after lengthy captivity	6
Hostages killed	6
Hostages reportedly killed or wounded by captors during the shootouts or assaults by security forces	5
Mixed outcomes	<u>4</u>
Total	66

Table A.14

COMPARISON OF KIDNAPPING AND BARRICADE SITUATIONS

	Kidnappings	Barricade and Hostage Situations
Hostages released	27	17
Hostages released after lengthy captivity	6	0
Hostages killed	6	0
Hostages killed or wounded by captors during shootouts or assaults by security forces	2	4
Mixed outcomes	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
Total	43	23

trivial. More people were killed in barricade and hostage situations, but out of a greater number seized.

A breakdown by number of hostages shows a total of 64 hostages seized in standard kidnappings of whom 10, or 16 percent, were killed. In addition, 284 hostages were seized in barricade and hostage situations of whom 43 or 15 percent died. In four incidents, however, hostages were not seized as part of a deliberate plan, but were only grabbed extemporaneously in a desperate attempt to effect escape. If we exclude

these three incidents, then the total is 43 killed out of 214, or 20 percent. Thus there has been no appreciable difference in danger to the hostage in standard kidnappings or barricade situations.

Of the total 348 hostages, only 3 percent were "executed" in cold blood, while 12 percent died during assaults by security forces. While we cannot be sure that many of those who died during assaults would not have been murdered by their captors anyway, it is striking that assaults may indirectly account for 42 of the 53 hostage deaths or 79 percent of them.* Twenty hostages were killed at Ma'alot and this may somewhat distort our figures. If we exclude Ma'alot, then assaults may indirectly account for 20 of 41 hostage deaths, or 49 percent.

The fate of the hostage, of course, also depends on the willingness of others to accede to the demands of his or her captors. Therefore, let us relate the response to the kidnappers' demands and the subsequent fate of the hostage or hostages. We have included only those episodes where explicit demands were made by the kidnappers holding hostages, and we have excluded those episodes where an assault by security forces ended the episode.† We have also excluded those cases in which either the nature of the demands or counter offers made is not clear (incidents 40 and 53), in which an unknown tacit agreement may have been reached (incident 26), in which communications broke down (incident 53), in which the hostage is still in captivity (incident 66), or in which the terrorists' own explosives accidentally detonated (incident 73). That leaves us with 44 episodes: 27 kidnappings and 17 barricade and hostage incidents. Finally, we are talking about *offers*, not *outcomes*, thus the totals do not coincide exactly with those in Table A.11.

In none of the cases where the kidnappers' demands were satisfied, or where they were offered something more than safe passage out of the

* In incidents 34 and 48, the demands of the kidnappers had been rejected; in incident 35, the kidnappers had been offered safe passage with their hostages to another country when the shootout began; and in incident 57, negotiations were underway when the shootout began.

† Thus excluding, among others, the six attempted kidnappings, the seven barricade and hostage situations that ended by gunfire before the kidnappers announced their demands, and the nine kidnappings in which no demands were made.

country but less than what they had originally demanded, were any hostages killed. Of the two kidnappings, both in Canada, and two barricade and hostage situations where those holding the hostage were offered safe passage out of the country in lieu of their original demands, in only one case was the hostage killed (incident 24). Of the 12 kidnappings in which the demands of the kidnappers were rejected, the hostages were killed in four cases, and subjected to lengthy captivity in two others.* Of the four barricade and hostage incidents in which demands were rejected, in one (incident 39), the kidnappers executed three of their five hostages;† in another (incident 50) the impasse was broken by a separate episode, and those holding the hostages were ultimately granted safe passage out of the country; in a third, the kidnappers flew with their hostages to a friendly Arab country and surrendered to authorities.

The Effects of Policy

Government policy on negotiations with terrorist kidnappers has an inconclusive relationship to future kidnapping trends for the target country. There are cases in which governments refused to negotiate concessions and yet there were further kidnappings; and there are contrary cases in which government concessions were not followed by further kidnappings. In all countries that have experienced a series of kidnappings by urban guerrilla organizations, the critical factor for terminating that series appears to be mainly the capacity of the local security forces to destroy the organization and apprehend its members.

Austria, Bolivia, and Haiti made concessions, yet were not made the targets of further terrorist kidnappings. Brazil, The Dominican

* In one of these (incident 20), the hostage was released after suffering a serious heart attack; in the other (incident 28), the hostage was released nine months later after the prisoners whose release had been demanded managed to escape.

† We have counted the Khartoum episode (incident 39) as a rejection of the kidnappers' demands; however, the kidnappers there were offered safe passage to another country with their hostages before killing three of their five hostages. That is not exactly a "Bangkok solution."

Republic, France, Guatemala, and Mexico first made concessions to terrorist kidnappers and did become the targets of subsequent episodes.

The Brazilian government consistently made full concessions to terrorist demands in exchange for the safe release of the hostage in four successful kidnappings (and one other attempt) there during approximately a one-year period. Meanwhile, security forces managed to destroy the various revolutionary groupings and apprehend or kill numerous members. Thus, regardless of the concessionary policy, and because of the general anti-terrorist campaign, the kidnapping series ended as abruptly as it had begun. The Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Mexico were each the target of one or two more hostage events, mainly carried out by revolutionary organizations that were (or are still being) broken by security forces. In the cases of three of these four countries (excluding Brazil), however, the governments shifted away from concessionary policies toward tough no-concession stances in the later situations.

What has been the pattern for those countries whose governments have changed from a policy aimed at securing the safe release of the hostage to an anti-concessionary policy? Mexico was still hit by another diplomat kidnapping. Yet terrorists there have recently preferred taking domestic hostages. In Guatemala the change in policy was not followed by further international kidnappings. It is still too soon to tell what relationship may exist for the Dominican case, since the policy change took place only in 1974.

Countries whose governments refused to negotiate concessions from the very beginning and that nevertheless were targets of future hostage events include Argentina, Colombia, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and Uruguay. In Colombia, the second of two diplomatic kidnappings occurred six years after the first one. Argentina, Turkey, and Uruguay each experienced two more diplomatic kidnapping events after government policy was set the first time (in Uruguay's case with a double kidnapping). Argentina was the first government to establish a no-concessions policy after similar kidnappings in Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala had already led to government concessions. In Argentina the terrorists subsequently switched to seizing foreign businessmen for ransom, but also continue to kidnap diplomats occasionally (see incident

67); and in Uruguay they turned to kidnapping local personages for propaganda and extortion. The revolutionary underground in both Turkey and Uruguay has been demolished, and in Argentina government policy appears to have had little bearing on the recently renewed perpetration of diplomatic kidnapping. After Jordan's first international kidnapping, it was the target of four more hostage events, all committed by Palestinians. Two of these were for interrogation purposes only, however, and the last two were barricade events outside the country. Israel, after its first foreign barricade situation abroad, was the target of two more such situations, and then the Palestinians shifted to commando raids that aimed at taking hostages within Israel. Thus no-concessions policies, while not immediately halting kidnapping tactics, may ultimately affect their form. The West German government has faced two kidnappings related to the Baader-Meinhof gang (in the case of a geologist kidnapped in Burma, the West German government might have paid a cash ransom, but the local government tried to prevent it).

Only Canada and Cuba have adopted hard-line, no-concession policies from the start and never had another hostage event. In the case of Canada we are in fact dealing with two kidnappings that overlapped as episodes. Over this short-term period, the government's hard-line reaction helped stimulate the terrorists to take the additional hostage because they apparently believed it would increase their leverage against the government. (This was also the case with one of the successor kidnappings in Uruguay.) Before long, however, Canadian security forces apprehended some of the terrorists and essentially destroyed their organization.*

We can find no significant association between government policy toward payoff outcomes on the one hand, and either the rank or number of hostages on the other hand. Government response is not generally determined by the nature of the hostages. Except possibly in one case

* Cases involving other governments are omitted from this review because government policy was not a factor, the case was unclear, or the government was targetted for the first time too recently to perceive any possible trend.

where many factors were at work, no government has made concessions for large-group or high-value hostages nor opposed concessions for presumably lower-value, small-group hostages.

EFFECT OF U.S. POLICY

As mentioned previously, U.S. diplomats and other citizens have provided the most popular targets of kidnappers, appearing in 29 (38 percent) of the 77 cases. It appears that many kidnappers have an exaggerated idea of the importance and influence of the U.S. government in regard to obtaining the release of its own officials.

The successful seizure of U.S. hostages for explicit bargaining purposes occurred in 15 cases, 14 of which involved diplomats or other representatives of the U.S. government. These various episodes seldom signified attempts to wring concessions directly from the U.S. government itself. In approximately two-thirds of the cases explicit demands were addressed to the local government. Demands were directed explicitly to the U.S. government in only three cases (incidents 30, 39, and 77) involving American hostages. In two more cases (incidents 53 and 60), the demands were not explicit. And in one case they were made on a U.S. firm as well as on a local government (incident 53). In the remaining 10 cases, the demands were levied on the local government. In possibly only one (incident 8) of these eight cases did the local government depart from its adopted policy or change its negotiating posture due to U.S. pressure.

As mentioned previously, U.S. policy has evolved from one in which emphasis was placed on obtaining the safe release of the hostage to one in which concessions were rejected and denounced, then more recently to a wait-and-see attitude. There is little conclusive evidence that this policy has had any effect on the choice of U.S. officials as targets. The pattern of kidnappings of U.S. officials generally corresponds to the pattern of international hostage incidents, which in turn corresponds to the overall pattern of terrorist activity in the world: 1970 was a peak year in which 30 percent of all hostage episodes listed in the chronology and 41 percent of those involving American hostages occurred. The total number of hostage incidents declined

in 1971 and 1972 and rose again in 1973, 1974, and 1975; this was also the case with those involving American hostages.*

Attempts to make hostages of American officials and other government representatives between August 1968 and June 1975 occurred with an average frequency of one every three months. Successful seizures of American hostages coupled with ransom demands occurred at an average rate of one every five months beginning September 1969 through June 1975.

If we take as our dividing line the March 1973 episode in Khartoum, in which two American diplomats were captured and later killed by Palestinian terrorists, as the clearest demonstration of a no-concessions policy by the U.S. government, we can see no drop in the frequency of kidnappings of American officials. From March 1973 up to and including the incident in Khartoum, attempts to kidnap American officials occurred on an average of once every three months. Successful kidnappings were followed by explicit ransom demands (thus we exclude kidnappings in which no ransom demands were made) on an average of once every five months. Since the incident in Khartoum, hostage attempts have occurred on an average of once every three months. Successful kidnappings involving ransom demands have occurred on an average of once every five months.

Given the correspondence we noted between the number of kidnappings and the overall level of terrorist activity in the world, given that in most cases the demands were *not* on the U.S. government, and finally given the lack of any conclusive evidence of a relationship between government policies and the occurrence or absence of subsequent hostage incidents, we are inclined to argue that the influence of American policy on the frequency of kidnappings of American officials has been marginal. The crackdowns on urban guerrilla movements in countries where American officials had been targets of kidnapping attempts -- Brazil, Uruguay, Guatemala, Turkey -- appear to be a more decisive factor in deterring or preventing future incidents.

* The two lines are not independent, of course, since American hostages were involved in over one-third of the episodes; however, the pattern is generally the same counting only the episodes in which U.S. officials were not involved.

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF INTERNATIONAL HOSTAGE INCIDENTS

1. John Gordon Mein, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala, was killed on August 28, 1968, when he attempted to avoid being kidnapped by FAR guerrillas.
2. Charles Burke Elbrick, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, was kidnapped on September 4, 1969, by members of the MR-8 and ALN. Ambassador Elbrick was released on September 7, 1969, after the Brazilian government released 15 prisoners.
3. Murray E. Jackson, the American consul general in Asmara, Ethiopia, was kidnapped, along with a British businessman, by members of the ELF on September 9, 1969. No ransom demands were made. After signing a document stating that he had been "instructed" in the ELF's objectives and that he had not been mistreated, he was released several hours later.
4. José Straessle, the son of the Swiss consul, and Hermann Buff, a Swiss diplomat, were kidnapped in Colombia on October 6, 1969. They were both released 17 days later after an undisclosed amount of ransom was reportedly paid by the captives' families.
5. Sean M. Holly, U.S. labor attaché, was kidnapped on March 6, 1970 by members of the FAR. The kidnappers released him on March 8, 1970, following the release of two prisoners by the Guatemalan government.
6. Nobuo Okuchi, Japanese Consul General in São Paulo, Brazil, was seized by members of the VPR on March 11, 1970. He was released on March 14, 1970, following the release of five prisoners by the Brazilian government.
7. In late March 1970, five members of a National Geographic film crew, including an American producer, were taken hostage in Ethiopia by members of the Eritrean Liberation Front. The ELF made no ransom demands but held the five persons hostage for 17 days. The hostages were released unharmed.
8. Lieutenant Donald J. Crowley, U.S. air attaché in the Dominican Republic, was kidnapped on March 24, 1970, by members of a group calling itself "United Anti-Reelection Command." He was released on March 28, 1970, following the government's release of 20 prisoners.
9. Joaquín Waldemar Sánchez, Paraguayan Consul in Argentina, was kidnapped by members of the FAL on March 24, 1970. He was released on March 28, 1970, despite the refusal of the Argentine government to release any prisoners as the kidnappers had demanded.

10. The attempted kidnapping of Yuri Pivovarov, Soviet assistant commercial attaché, by members of MANO, in Argentina, occurred March 29, 1970.
11. Count Karl von Spreti, West German ambassador to Guatemala, was kidnapped by members of the FAR on March 31, 1970. The Guatemalan government refused to release any prisoners as the kidnappers had demanded. An anonymous phone call was received on April 5, 1970, identifying the location of the ambassador's body.
12. Curtis S. Cutter, U.S. Consul General to Brazil, eluded a kidnapping attempt in Porto Alegre on April 5, 1970. Members of the VPR were later arrested in connection with this incident.
13. On April 21, 1970, Jack Fry, a U.S. Peace Corps volunteer, and his wife were taken from a train in Ethiopia by members of the ELF. They were held for five days and released unharmed. No ransom demands were made.
14. Morris Draper, U.S. political secretary in Jordan, was kidnapped by members of the PFLP on June 7, 1970. He was released unharmed on June 8, 1970, despite the refusal of the Jordanian government to release any prisoners in exchange for the hostage.
15. Ehrenfried von Holleben, West German ambassador to Brazil, was kidnapped on June 11, 1970, by members of the ALN and the VPR. He was released unharmed on June 16, 1970, following the release of 40 prisoners.
16. Two West German technicians were taken hostage and hidden in the jungle by guerrillas in Bolivia on July 21, 1970. They were released after the Bolivian government agreed to release ten prisoners.
17. Daniel A. Mitrione, U.S. public safety adviser in Uruguay, was kidnapped on July 31, 1970, by the Tupamaros. The kidnappers demanded the release of approximately 150 prisoners. The government refused to negotiate. Mitrione was killed and his body was found on August 10, 1970.
18. Aloysio Mares Dias Gomide, Brazilian consul, was kidnapped in Uruguay by Tupamaros on July 31, 1970. The kidnappers' demands were the same as those for Daniel Mitrione. He was released on February 21, 1971, after payment by the family of an undisclosed amount of cash ransom.
19. Tupamaro guerrillas attempted to kidnap Michael Gordon Jones, second secretary to the U.S. embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay, on July 31, 1970.
20. Claude L. Fly, U.S. agricultural adviser, was kidnapped on August 7, 1970, by Tupamaros. The kidnappers' demands were the same as

those for Mitrione and Gomide. Despite the refusal of the Uruguayan government to negotiate, Fly was released seven months later on March 2, 1971, following a serious heart attack.

21. John Stewart, the U.S. cultural affairs officer in Jordan, was kidnapped and held for one day by the PLA on September 11, 1970. He was interrogated. No ransom demands were made and he was released unharmed the following day.
22. Staff Sergeant Ervin Graham, an American soldier assigned to the U.S. defense attaché's office in Jordan, was held 8 days by Palestinian guerrillas in September 1970. He was interrogated and released. No ransom demands were made.
23. James R. Cross, British Trade Commissioner in Quebec, Canada, was kidnapped on October 5, 1970, by members of the FLQ, who demanded the release of 13 prisoners and \$500,000 in gold. The Canadian government refused to accede to these demands but offered the kidnappers safe passage out of the country. Cross was released on December 3, 1970, and the kidnappers were flown to Cuba.
24. Meanwhile, a different group within the FLQ kidnapped Pierre LaPorte, a Canadian government official, on October 10, to strengthen the bargaining position of the kidnappers of Cross. When these demands were refused, LaPorte was killed and his body was found on October 18.
25. Douglas MacArthur, the U.S. ambassador to Iran, was the target of an attempted kidnapping by urban guerrillas in November 1970. Although one shot was fired at the ambassador, he escaped without injury.
26. Eugen Beihl, the honorary West German consul in San Sebastian, Spain, was kidnapped on December 1, 1970, by ETA members. He was released unharmed on December 24, 1970. It is not clear whether there was some tacit arrangement between the government and the ETA.
27. Giovanni Enrico Bucher, Swiss ambassador to Brazil, was kidnapped in Rio de Janeiro on December 7, 1970, by members of the ALN and VPR. He was released unharmed on January 17, 1971, following the release of 70 prisoners.
28. Geoffrey M. S. Jackson, British ambassador to Uruguay, was kidnapped by Tupamaro guerrillas on January 8, 1971. The Tupamaros, still holding both Dias Gomide and Claude Fly, continued to demand the release of 150 prisoners. The government of Uruguay refused to negotiate. Jackson was held until September 9, 1971, three days after 106 of the prisoners on the Tupamaros' list escaped from jail.
29. On February 15, 1971, the TPLA kidnapped James Finley, a USAF

security policeman patrolling the Ankara Air Station, but made no ransom demands. He was released 17 hours after his capture.

30. Four U.S. servicemen stationed in Turkey were kidnapped by members of the TPLA on March 4, 1971. The kidnappers demanded the payment of \$400,000 and the publication of a manifesto. The government of Turkey refused to negotiate and instead launched a search for the kidnappers, who released the four airmen unharmed on March 8, 1971.
31. Ephraim Elrom, Israeli consul general in Istanbul, Turkey, was kidnapped by the TPLF, an organization related to the TPLA, on May 17, 1971. The kidnappers demanded the release of all guerrillas detained by the Turkish government. The government rejected the demands and launched a house-to-house search in Istanbul. The consul general's body was found on May 23, 1971.
32. Stanley Sylvester, honorary British consul and Swift & Co. executive, was kidnapped in Argentina on May 23, 1971, by members of the ERP. He was released on May 30, 1971, after the company agreed to donate \$62,500 worth of food, clothing, and school supplies to the poor.
33. Basque nationalists of the ETA attempted to kidnap Henri Wolimer, the French consul in San Sebastian, Spain, on May 29, 1971.
34. Three NATO radar technicians (two British and one Canadian) were kidnapped on March 27, 1971, in Turkey, by members of the TPLA. The kidnappers demanded the release of three imprisoned terrorists. The government refused to negotiate. When police located and surrounded the kidnappers' hideout, the three hostages were executed and the kidnappers perished in the ensuing gunbattle.
35. On September 5, 1972, eight Palestinian guerrillas broke into the Israeli quarters at the Olympic Games in Munich, killing two Israeli athletes and taking nine others hostage. The guerrillas demanded the release of 200 Palestinians imprisoned in Israel and safe passage for themselves and their hostages to another country. In a subsequent gunfight with West German police, five of the terrorists and all nine hostages were killed. Black September claimed responsibility for the attack.
36. Four members of Black September, a Palestinian terrorist organization, took over the Israeli embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, on December 28, 1972, and held six hostages for 19 hours. They demanded the release of 36 Arab guerrillas imprisoned in Israel. Thai officials and the Egyptian ambassador in Bangkok persuaded the guerrillas to release their hostages in return for safe conduct to Egypt.
37. Two armed gunmen and one woman kidnapped the U.S. ambassador to Haiti on January 23, 1973, and held him hostage along with the U.S. consul general. In return for the two hostages, the kidnappers demanded the release of 30 prisoners and a ransom of \$1

million. In subsequent negotiations they agreed to accept the release of 12 prisoners and \$70,000. The kidnappers released their hostages after 18 hours and flew with the released prisoners to Mexico.

38. Three Pakistani youths attacked the Indian High Commission in London and held staff members hostage, injuring some of them, on February 20, 1973. British police shot two of the gunmen and arrested the third, who said they belonged to a group called "Black December." They had intended to take hostages in order to obtain an audience with Prime Minister Indira Ghandi and to demand the release of Pakistani prisoners of war.
39. On March 1, 1973, eight members of Black September took over the Saudi Arabian embassy in Khartoum and seized several hostages, including the U.S. ambassador, the U.S. deputy chief of mission, and the Belgian chargé. The Jordanian chargé d'affaires and Saudi Arabian ambassador were also held. Many other diplomats escaped. The terrorists demanded the release of 60 Palestinian guerrillas being held in Jordan, all Arab women detained in Israel, Sirhan Sirhan (the killer of Senator Robert Kennedy), and imprisoned members of the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany. When negotiations failed, the terrorists executed the two U.S. diplomats and the Belgian chargé on the night of March 2. The terrorists then tried to bargain for safe passage to another country, but this was rejected. They surrendered on March 3.
40. On April 16, 1973, Shan insurgents kidnapped two Soviet doctors in Burma. The insurgents demanded the release of an imprisoned Shan leader in return for the safe release of the two doctors. Both the Soviet Union and, according to one report, American intelligence officials participated in the subsequent negotiations, which are cloaked in secrecy. The ultimate agreement that was reached is not known, although the rebels apparently did get something. One of the two doctors was released on February 2, 1974, the other on June 10, 1974.
41. The U.S. consul general in Guadalajara was kidnapped on May 4, 1973, by members of the "People's Revolutionary Armed Forces." They demanded the release of 30 prisoners held in Mexico. Later, they asked for a ransom of \$80,000. The Mexican government acceded to all of the demands and the consul's wife arranged for payment of the ransom. He was freed unharmed on May 6.
42. A lone Palestinian guerrilla armed with a machine gun and hand grenades attempted to attack the EL AL offices in Athens on July 19, 1973. He was prevented from entering the office by the closed bullet-proof inner glass doors. The terrorist then fled to a nearby hotel where he cornered 17 hostages. Negotiations, undertaken by the ambassadors of Egypt, Libya, and Iraq, continued for several hours. It was finally agreed to allow the terrorist to be flown to Kuwait where he vanished. The hostages were released unharmed. The man claimed to be a member of the "Organization of Victims of Occupied Territories."

43. On August 5, 1973, two Arabs armed with machine guns and hand grenades opened fire on passengers at the Athens airport. Three passengers were killed and 55 wounded. The terrorists then seized 35 hostages but later surrendered to Greek police. Later, a new group calling itself the "Seventh Suicide Squad" claimed responsibility for the attack, which it named the "Bahr al-Bakr" operation after a Cairo suburb where Israeli planes bombed a school in 1970.
44. Five Palestinian commandos broke into the Saudi Arabian embassy in Paris on September 5, 1973, and seized 13 hostages. They demanded the release of an Al Fatah leader imprisoned in Jordan. After 28 hours of negotiations in which a number of Arab ambassadors participated as intermediaries, the commandos dropped this demand and asked for safe passage out of the country. They agreed to release all but four of the hostages and were allowed to board a Syrian plane, which flew them to Kuwait. On September 7 the commandos and their hostages transferred to a Kuwaiti plane and flew over Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The commandos threatened to throw the hostages out of the plane unless the Saudi Arabian government helped them obtain the release of the Al Fatah leader. When Saudi Arabian officials refused, the plane was ordered to return to Kuwait. On September 8 the hostages were released and the commandos surrendered. The five claimed to be members of a group called "Punishment."
45. On September 28, 1973, three Jewish emigrés en route from the Soviet Union to Israel and an Austrian customs official were seized by two armed Arabs who claimed to be members of the "Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution." The terrorists seized their hostages aboard a train, later commandeered a car, and drove to the Vienna airport. They demanded that the Austrian government close Schonau Castle, a transit camp for Jewish emigrés operated by the Jewish Agency. The Austrian government agreed and the terrorists released their hostages and were flown to Libya.
46. Claiming to be a revolutionary, a lone gunman held a hostage the son of the Mexican ambassador to the Dominican Republic on September 28, 1973. The man, who had been living in the embassy as a political refugee for more than a year, demanded safe passage out of the country in return for the release of his hostage. The government of the Dominican Republic agreed. The kidnapper released the boy at the airport and was flown out of the country.
47. Anthony Duncan Williams, the honorary British consul in Guadalajara, Mexico, was kidnapped by terrorists on October 10, 1973. They demanded the release of 51 political prisoners and \$200,000 ransom. The Mexican government refused to release any prisoners. The consul was released unharmed on October 14.
48. On October 16, 1973, an anti-Castro Cuban kidnapped Jean Somerhausen, the Belgian ambassador to Cuba. At the French embassy in

Havana he demanded to leave Cuba. Pierre Anthonioz, the French ambassador, remained with Somerhausen as a voluntary hostage. Rejecting the kidnapper's demands, Cuban security forces secretly entered the embassy to rescue the hostages. The gunman died as a result of wounds received in the shootout. The two ambassadors were unharmed.

49. Kurt Nagel, the honorary West German consul in Maracaibo, Venezuela, was kidnapped on November 20, 1973, by members of *Bandera Roja* (Red Flag), a leftist guerrilla movement. The kidnappers reportedly had drafted demands for a ransom of 100,000 Bolivars, but before the note was delivered, a group of local villagers believing the kidnappers to be cattle rustlers raided their hideout and rescued Nagel.
50. Two Japanese belonging to the radical Japanese Red Army and two Arabs of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine tried to blow up a Shell refinery in Singapore on January 31, 1974, then seized eight hostages aboard a ferryboat and threatened to kill themselves and the hostages unless they were given safe passage to an Arab country. The government of Singapore refused and the situation remained at an impasse until February 6 (see the following episode).
51. On February 6, five members of the PFLP took over the Japanese embassy in Kuwait, holding about 12 hostages including the Japanese ambassador. They demanded that the Japanese government supply an airplane to bring their comrades from Singapore to Kuwait. The plane carrying the four guerrillas from Singapore landed in Kuwait and, after picking up the other five, who had released their hostages, went on to Yemen-Aden, where it arrived on February 8.
52. Three members of a group called Moslem International Guerrillas seized a Greek freighter in the port of Karachi, Pakistan, on February 2, 1974, and said they would blow up the ship and kill two hostages unless the Greek government freed two Arab terrorists who had received the death sentence. The gunmen freed the hostages and were flown out of the country after receiving assurances that Greece would lift the death sentence. The imprisoned terrorists were later released and allowed to fly to Libya.
53. John Patterson, the U.S. vice consul stationed in Hermosillo, Mexico, was kidnapped on March 25, 1974. A note demanding a reported \$500,000 was found on the consulate floor. Subsequently, the vice consul's body was found. The original note left at the consulate claimed that the 'Mexican People's Revolutionary Army' was responsible, but later, American authorities arrested and charged an American citizen with the kidnapping.
54. On March 26, 1974, the ELF seized the pilot and passengers of a helicopter downed in Ethiopia. The helicopter, which had been hired by Tenneco Oil, Inc., carried the pilot and four passengers including two employees of Tenneco, an employee of Texaco, and a

UN official. In return for their release, the ELF demanded that Tenneco assist the ELF in gaining the release of 75 political prisoners held by the Ethiopian government, employ a journalist to publish the ELF story, suspend further exploration until the ELF and the government came to peace, and that the hostages not return to Ethiopia. Tenneco agreed to discuss the demands. At one point during the negotiations, the ELF agreed to release two of the hostages. A second helicopter was sent by Tenneco to retrieve them on May 27, but its pilot was also taken hostage. The guerrillas then kidnapped two missionary nurses, one American and the other Dutch. The Dutch nurse was killed on the same day of her capture. The American nurse and pilot of the second helicopter were released unharmed on June 23, 1974. On June 26 the first pilot was released unharmed. The remaining four hostages were released unharmed by the ELF on September 10, 1974.

55. Alfred E. Laun, the head of the U.S. Information Service branch in Córdoba, Argentina, was wounded and kidnapped by the People's Revolutionary Army on April 12, 1974. The guerrillas released him the same day apparently because of the seriousness of his wounds.
56. Eighteen people were killed and 16 were wounded in Kiryat Shemona, Israel, by three Arab guerrillas who stormed a residential building on April 12, 1974. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command, which claimed credit for the operation, demanded the release of 100 prisoners in Israel. The guerrillas themselves made no demands. They died in an explosion at the end of a gun and grenade battle with Israeli troops. Israeli forces carried out retaliatory raids across the Lebanese border after the victims of the Arab terrorist raid were buried.
57. On May 15, 1974, three Arab guerrillas belonging to the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine crossed the border from Lebanon into Israel where they attacked a van bringing Arab women home from work. Two were killed, one was wounded. The three then entered the Israeli town of Ma'alot where they killed three more before seizing about 90 teenagers in a school building. The guerrillas demanded the release of 23 jailed terrorists. Israel agreed but negotiations subsequently broke down; minutes before the deadline, Israeli security forces rushed the school. The three Arabs were killed along with one Israeli soldier and 20 children. Seventy were injured.
58. On June 13, 1974, four Arab terrorists shot their way into Shamir, an Israeli settlement killing three women before they themselves were killed. They carried leaflets from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine demanding the release of 100 prisoners, including the captured survivor of the attack at Lod Airport in May 1972.
59. Three Arab terrorists entered Israel and seized hostages in an apartment building in Nahariyya on June 24, 1974. They killed four persons and wounded eight before they were killed in a gun battle.

60. On September 7, 1974, gunmen kidnapped Barbara Hutchison, director of the United States Information Service in the Dominican Republic. They took her to the Venezuelan consulate where they had seized six other hostages. The kidnappers demanded the payment of \$1 million ransom and the release of 37 prisoners imprisoned in the Dominican Republic. Both demands were refused. After 13 days at negotiations, the kidnappers released their hostages in return for safe passage out of the country. One of the hostages escaped by jumping out a window during the course of the negotiations.
61. Three Japanese terrorists, members of the United Red Army, entered the French embassy in The Hague, Netherlands, on September 13, 1974, where they seized five hostages including Jacques Senard, the French ambassador to The Netherlands. They demanded the release of a Red Army member imprisoned in Paris. The French government agreed to the demand and the hostages were released. The kidnappers were flown to a Middle Eastern country as part of the bargain.
62. On November 18, 1974, a lone gunman entered the Philippine embassy in Washington, D.C., where he wounded one embassy official and seized the Philippine ambassador to the United States. He demanded that his son, whose exit visa from the Philippines had been delayed, be permitted to join the rest of his family in the United States. The Philippine government agreed and the son was immediately flown to Washington whereupon the gunman released his hostage and surrendered to authorities.
63. Three Arab terrorists entered an apartment building in Beit Shean, Israel, on November 19, 1974. Evidence indicated that they had planned to take hostages, but after killing four civilians, they were killed themselves.
64. On December 27, 1974, nine members of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, a leftist guerrilla group in Nicaragua, invaded a private home where a party was being given in honor of Turner B. Shelton, the U.S. ambassador. Ambassador Shelton had already left the party, but the guerrillas seized hostages including the Nicaraguan foreign minister, Nicaragua's ambassador to the United States, and the Chilean ambassador to Nicaragua. Four people were killed in the initial assault. The kidnappers demanded that the Nicaraguan government release 14 prisoners, pay the kidnappers \$1 million in ransom, and fly the kidnappers and prisoners to Cuba. They also demanded that the government broadcast an anti-government statement. The government agreed to all of the demands and the hostages were released 61 hours later.
65. Eighteen people were wounded on January 19, 1975, when three Arab terrorists tossed grenades and exchanged gunfire with policemen after an unsuccessful attack on a taxiing El Al Israeli airliner at Orly airport near Paris. After the exchange of gunfire, the three gunmen took refuge in an airport washroom, taking ten

hostages with them. After negotiations with the French authorities through the Egyptian ambassador in Paris and the French Interior Minister, the guerrillas released a woman and a four-year old child. The remaining hostages were released on January 20 in exchange for a French Boeing 707 and a three-member crew, which flew the guerrillas to the Middle East. After being denied permission to land in several countries, the plane was finally allowed to land at Baghdad airport and the guerrillas gave themselves up to the Iraqi authorities. The *Muhammad Boudiya* guerrilla group claimed responsibility for the attack.

66. Eric Leupin, the honorary consul of the Netherlands, was kidnapped on February 1, 1975, in Cali, Colombia, by 30 members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The guerrillas demanded the release of another FARC member who has been in a Colombian prison since 1971. As of May 1976, Leupin had not been released. Although there have been no official ransom demands, Leupin's wife was arrested on May 3, 1976, by the Colombian Army for attempting to deliver a \$50,000 ransom to the guerrillas.
67. John Patrick Egan, a U.S. consular agent in Córdoba, Argentina, was kidnapped on February 26, 1975, by Montenero guerrillas. A communique, signed by the guerrillas, listed the names of four leftist Peronists who had disappeared in previous months and demanded that the government show them alive on television. Informed sources said the Argentine Foreign Ministry advised the U.S. embassy that the four persons named in the ransom demand were not being held by the government. Egan's body was found February 28 in a suburban Córdoba residential area.
68. Two armed men and a woman kidnapped Peter Lorenz, the Christian Democratic Union Party candidate for Mayor of West Berlin on February 27, 1975. The trio ambushed Lorenz's chauffeur-driven car as he was en route to his office in Berlin. (The episode has been included as an act of international terrorism because the sovereignty of West Berlin still resides in the occupying powers, not West Germany.) The female kidnapper was later identified as a fugitive anarchist linked to the Baader-Meinhof band of urban guerrillas. The June 2d Movement claimed responsibility for the kidnapping. West German government authorities agreed to the kidnappers' terms and released five convicted anarchists from West German prisons and flew them, plus a hostage, out of Frankfurt airport for an unknown destination. A sixth prisoner, whose release was requested, refused to join the group. The prisoners were also given \$50,000. Other demands met by the government included the release of two persons jailed for their role in violent demonstrations in November 1974 after the death of an imprisoned urban guerrilla leader.

A Lufthansa jet carrying the prisoners landed in Aden on March 3. After the Aden government granted amnesty to the five, the lone hostage flew back to West Berlin on March 4 and appeared on

television to read a statement from the anarchists. The statement also contained an apparent code signaling that the kidnappers were safe and that Lorenz should be released. Lorenz was released on March 4.

69. A West German geologist, Gert Windhein, was captured on March 4, 1975, in Northeast Burma by the Kachin Independence Army, which demanded ransom of one million German marks (\$390,000 U.S.). The West German government offered to pay the ransom, but the Burmese government refused to pay. It is not known if the ransom demands were met. Mr. Windhein was released unharmed on May 7.
70. Eighteen persons--eight civilian hostages, seven terrorists and three Israeli soldiers--died, and 12 more were wounded in a shoot-out on March 5, 1975, when Palestinian terrorists belonging to Al Fatah seized hostages at the Hotel Savoy in downtown Tel Aviv, Israel. The terrorists' original target was Tel Aviv's Municipality Youth Center, where they hoped to take a number of Israeli youngsters hostage. The Arab's rubber dinghy put ashore about half a mile from the youth center, and as the eight guerrillas made their way up the sandy beach, they were spotted by a policeman. The terrorists dashed down a side street to the Savoy Hotel and seized ten hostages. At first they demanded a plane to take them to Damascus and release of ten prisoners held by the Israelis. They also asked to speak to the French, Greek, and Vatican envoys in Tel Aviv. Later, they reduced their demands to free passage for themselves in a United Nations plane to Damascus. However, Israeli soldiers opened fire on the hotel and simultaneously, a special Israeli commando squad charged up ladders and dived into the hotel through windows. As the troops closed in on the fourth floor where the terrorists were holding their captives, one of the terrorists set off an explosion that left the top floor of the hotel in ruins. One Arab terrorist was captured in the attack.
71. John McKay, a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency official, was detained by Palestinians at the Sabra refugee camp in Beirut, Lebanon, on April 16, 1975. He was released unharmed after two days of interrogation.
72. Jean Gueury, the French ambassador to Somalia, was kidnapped in Mogadishu on March 23, 1975, by members of the Front for the Liberation of Coastal Somalia, as he was leaving a church. The ambassador was taken by his kidnappers to a house that was promptly surrounded by Somalese security forces. With the Italian ambassador acting as intermediary, the members of the Front demanded the release of two guerrillas who were serving life sentences in France for assassination attempts in the adjacent territory of Afars and Issas. plus \$100,000 in ransom. On March 25, it was reported that the French government had agreed to meet the kidnappers' demand. It was planned that the French ambassador would be flown to South Yemen with his captors. The ambassador was freed in Aden on March 28, and the kidnappers and the freed guerrillas were placed under guard by the South Yemeni authorities.

73. Seven West German terrorists took over the German Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden, on April 24, 1975, and seized 12 hostages, including the West German ambassador to Sweden. Two of the hostages were killed during the 12-hour episode. Identifying themselves as members of a group called "Kommando Holger Meins," the terrorists demanded that 26 comrades imprisoned in West Germany be freed and flown out of the country with more than \$500,000 ransom. When the West German government refused to release the prisoners, the terrorists set off their explosives and attempted to escape. Several hostages were injured in the explosion. Six of the terrorists were captured; the seventh reportedly committed suicide rather than allow himself to be taken alive.
74. Michael Konner, an American Foreign Service officer in Beirut, Lebanon, was abducted on May 13, 1975, by three persons identifying themselves as Palestinians. He was interrogated and roughed up but not injured seriously. He was released 14 hours later. No demands were made for his release.
75. Three Stanford University students and a Dutch administrative assistant were kidnapped on May 19, 1975, in a guerrilla raid on the Gombe Stream Research Center in Tanzania. The guerrillas, who were members of the Popular Revolutionary Party (PRP), a Marxist-oriented group, demanded \$450,000 in ransom, American arms and ammunition, and the release of radical leaders in Zaire in exchange for the four hostages. The principal demand required that Julius K. Nyerere, the President of Tanzania, should assist in arming a rebel movement in Zaire with the help of the United States. The guerrillas released one American woman six days after her capture so that she could carry the rebels' demand for money, weapons, and the release of PRP members held in Tanzania. The government of Tanzania refused the demands, but a group of negotiators representing the parents and Stanford University began talks that eventually resulted in the release of the remaining hostages, but only after a cash ransom was paid.
76. Four Arab guerrillas of the Arab Liberation Front seized six hostages in the cooperative farm village of Kfar Yuval in Israel on June 14, 1975. The guerrillas barricaded themselves inside a village house with their hostages and demanded that Israel release 12 Arab prisoners. Israeli troops attacked the group and killed the four guerrillas.
77. U.S. Army Colonel Ernest Morgan was seized from a taxicab at a roadblock by armed men in Beirut on June 29, 1975. A little-known Palestinian group calling itself The Organization of Revolutionary Socialist Action, a splinter of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, claimed responsibility for the kidnapping. The group demanded that the United States provide 230 tons of food, 600 tons of building materials, and clothing for 3000 residents of a slum section badly damaged by the civil war in Beirut. The United States rejected the demands. On July 11, after 12 days of

captivity, Colonel Morgan was released by the guerrillas when anonymous donors, possibly fronting for the Lebanese government, distributed an estimated 12 tons of food in the impoverished neighborhood.

78. On July 14, 1975, Steven Campbell and James Harrell, two American civilian technicians working at the U.S.-operated military communications facility near Asmara, were kidnapped by guerrillas. The Popular Liberation Front claimed credit. No immediate demands for their release were publicized until after the kidnapping of two American servicemen in September (see incidents 80 and 90). The two were released on May 3, 1976.
79. On August 3, 1975, Japanese terrorists of the United Red Army seized the consular section of the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. They seized 53 hostages including U.S. Consul Robert Stebbins and Swedish Chargé d' Affaires Frederick Bergenstrahle. They demanded the release of seven Japanese extremists held in Japan. The government of Japan agreed to release five of the prisoners. Two of the prisoners whose release was demanded stated that they did not want to go. The prisoners were flown to Kuala Lumpur on August 7 where they were joined by the terrorists. Accompanied by two Malaysian and two Japanese government officials who volunteered to replace those held at the embassy, the group flew to Libya where the terrorists surrendered themselves to Libyan government authorities.
80. Eritrean separatists again attacked the U.S.-operated communications facility near Asmara, Ethiopia on September 14, 1975, and seized a number of hostages including Thomas C. Powidowicz and David Strickland, two American servicemen working at the site. Spokesman for the ELF in Beirut demanded through the press that the United States cease all military aid to the government of Ethiopia, close the communication facility near Asmara, dismantle an Ethiopian naval base under construction at Massawa, pay compensation for damage done to Eritrean villages by the U.S.-equipped Ethiopian Air Force, and exert pressure on the Ethiopian government to free all Eritrean rebels it holds in prisons. The two servicemen were released unharmed on January 9, 1976.
81. On September 15, 1975, four Arab terrorists forced their way into the Egyptian Embassy in Madrid, Spain and threatened to blow it up and kill the Egyptian ambassador and two aides unless Egypt renounced its Sinai agreement with Israel. The Egyptian ambassador in Madrid, along with the ambassadors of Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, and Jordan, who acted as mediators, signed a document denouncing the Sinai agreement. The terrorists with their three Egyptian hostages accompanied by the Iraqi and Algerian ambassadors flew to Algeria on September 16 where they released their prisoners. The Egyptian government called the document that ended the siege "a worthless piece of paper."

82. Tiede Herrema, a Dutch businessman in Ireland, was kidnapped on October 3, 1975, by Irish extremists. The kidnappers demanded that the Irish government release three IRA prisoners. The government rejected these demands and launched a search for their hide-out. The two kidnappers and their hostage were located and surrounded by Irish police on October 21, 1975. After 18 days of negotiations, the kidnappers surrendered on November 8.

83. Ten armed refugees living in Argentina, nine of them Chileans and one Brazilian, seized 14 hostages at the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in Buenos Aires on October 8, 1975. Among the hostages were the Swiss head of the Commission in Argentina plus UN employees from five countries. The refugees threatened to kill the hostages unless they were given safe passage for themselves and their families to Sweden or another European country that would accept them. Argentina agreed to give the captors safe passage out of the country; only Algeria would grant them asylum. The group released their hostages and were flown out of the country on October 10.

84. Basil Burwood-Taylor, the honorary British consul in Asmara, Ethiopia, was kidnapped from his office on October 22, 1975, by members of the Popular Liberation Forces, an Eritrean separatist group. He was released unharmed on May 3, 1976.

85. Charles Gallagher and William Dykes, two USIS officials, were kidnapped by leftist gunmen in Beirut on October 22, 1975. It was never announced publicly who was holding them or if there were any conditions for their release. It was widely reported, however, that Palestinian organizations had acted as intermediaries in the negotiations that led to their release on February 25, 1976.

86. One French and two Scandinavian diplomats were kidnapped from a Beirut hotel by leftist gunmen on October 25, 1975. They were released unharmed after intervention by the Palestine Liberation Organization.

87. Six armed extremists calling themselves the "Free South Moluccan Youths," demanding independence for the Indonesian Island of South Molucca, seized a passenger train in The Netherlands on December 2, 1975. They killed three men and took over 60 hostages. Twenty-six of the hostages were released or escaped, leaving 38 hostages on the train. The terrorists demanded the release of five Moluccans imprisoned in The Netherlands, Dutch recognition of their government in exile, a bus to take them to the airport, and a plane to fly them to an undisclosed destination. The Dutch government rejected all demands. After a 12-day siege, the terrorists released their hostages and surrendered.

88. A separate group of six South Moluccan extremists shot their way into the Indonesian consulate in Amsterdam on December 4, 1975, and seized 43 persons hostage. One person was killed in a fall as he

attempted to escape. The terrorists sought independence for the formerly Dutch-ruled island of South Molucca. All demands were rejected. After a 16-day siege, the hostages were released, and the terrorists surrendered.

89. On December 21, 1975, six German, Arab, and Latin American terrorists calling themselves the "Arm of the Arab Revolution" burst into a meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna, Austria, taking 60 people hostage. Among the hostages were 11 delegates to the meeting, including the oil ministers of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela, and Colombia. The demanded a plane to take them and their hostages out of Austria. The government of Austria complied, and a jetliner with 41 hostages flew to Algeria, where most of the hostages were released, then to Libya. Taking off again, the plane was refused permission to land in Baghdad and Tunis and returned to Algiers where the terrorists released their hostages and were in turn granted political asylum by the government of Algeria.
90. On December 25, 1975, Ronald Michalke, an American civilian working at the U.S.-run communications facility near Asmara, Ethiopia, was kidnapped by members of the Eritrean Liberation Front. This was the third incident in 1975 involving Americans in Ethiopia and brought to five the number of American hostages being held by Ethiopian separatists. He was still being held as of May 1976.

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